INTRODUCTION
Do welfare regimes infl uence the views on the role of state? The affi rmative answers to this question are usually based on three interrelated ideas. The fi rst is the main claim of the power resources approach, most famously argued by Esping-Andersen, that different welfare institutional confi gurations (regimes) stem out of the differential power of the working-class movements and the political coalitions at particular historical moments (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Brooks & Manza, 2007; Aidukaite, 2009) . Next is the claim, in congruence with the path-dependency theories, that once the welfare regimes are established, they are slow to change and their further developments follow the established trajectories (Brooks & Manza, 2007) . Finally, values are even slower to change than institutions, so the ideological pillars of the established welfare regimes become embedded in peoples' preferences and expectations (Brooks & Manza, 2007) . These, in turn, provide legitimacy for the institutional persistence and thwart further institutional change (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Brooks & Manza, 2007) . Hence, different welfare regimes are expected to shape different welfare public preferences, which then sustain existing institutional confi gurations.
Nevertheless, the research examining the link between welfare regimes and welfare attitudes is inconclusive. Some studies found little effect of the welfare regimes on attitudes, while others found attitudes clustering in accordance with the regime expectations (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jaeger, 2006a) . However, as Jaeger (2009) notes, various studies operationalized welfare regimes differently, which often resulted in the same countries being classifi ed as different regimes. This naturally leads to inconsistent results. Further, welfare attitudes were operationalized differently as well, as some examined general attitudes towards state or redistribution, and others examined attitudes to specifi c welfare policies (Svallfors, 2010) . However, when a study seeks to examine the link between welfare regimes and ideological regime expectations, as the present study does, examining general attitudes seems a more appropriate strategy.
The post-communist states further complicate the regime classifi cations, and many studies exclude them from the analyses of the welfare state attitudes. This might have been justifi ed in times of their former communist regimes, but today the excuses for excluding the Central and Eastern European countries from the "worlds of welfare capitalism" must certainly wear thin. Indeed, neglecting the post-communist states, with their shared communist welfare features and different welfare paths after the 1989/1991 ruptures (Deacon, 2000; Fenger, 2007; Aidukaite, 2009) , means losing potentially quite a fruitful area for the investigation of the link between the institutions and attitudes in times of change.
Therefore, the present study examines whether the welfare state attitudes separate the post-communist countries from other European welfare states which did not experience such a radical institutional transformation just one generation ago. To further gauge the link between the institutional heritage and the welfare state attitudes, the study focuses on the attitudes of the communist and the post-communist cohorts, where the former were socialized in communism and the latter in capitalism. Finally, these two cohorts' welfare state attitudes are compared to the attitudes of their counterparts in other European welfare states.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Welfare State Regimes
In his 1990 book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen analyzes 18 advanced industrial democracies and proposes that they cluster into three welfare regimes, based on historical developments and levels of decommodifi cation and stratifi cation, which are also partly due to the different ideological roles accorded to the state, market and family in providing for people's needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990 , 1999 . At one end are the liberal regimes with low decommodification and high stratifi cation in which the role of state is the weakest and the role of market the strongest, as the individuals are responsible for their own welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts & Gelissen, 2001) . The conservative-corporatist regimes are in the middle, as their entitlements are tied to social contributions, so the individuals' labor market status affects their decommodifi cation and stratifi cation levels. Hence, the role of state is strong, but limited to the working population, while the rest must depend on family to take care of their needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts & Gelissen, 2001) . At the other end are the social democratic regimes, characterized by high decommodifi cation and the least stratifying or status-based effect of social policies, where much of the burden of individuals' and family's needs is taken over by the state through the universal benefi ts and the provision of services (Esping-Andersen, 1990) .
The three welfare regimes argument has been immensely infl uential. Admittedly, it underwent various critiques and several re-conceptualizations (for a review, see Arts & Gelissen, 2002) , but in its simplicity and resonance it remains one of the most empirically implemented classifi cations. Further, many re-conceptualizations use different regime indicators, but remain similar to Esping-Andersen's three-fold distinction (Arts & Gelissen, 2002) . However, some authors argue for additional regime types. Thus, in the European context, Ferrera (1996) proposes that Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal should be classifi ed as a Southern or Mediterranean regime. For example, these countries are characterized by an important ideological role of family stemming from the strong religious infl uences and the prevalence of the traditional perspectives on family (Ferrera, 1996) . But, in the context of this paper, the complex role of state in the Mediterranean regimes is even more interesting. The ruling elites of the Mediterranean regimes traditionally espouse the corporatist ideology, which is the reason why these countries are usually classifi ed as conservative-corporatist regimes. At the same time, however, these countries also share a tradition of the Left parties pushing for socialist reforms (Ferrera, 1996) . These Left parties are traditionally not a part of the ruling structures, but their continual presence in the political life "disrupts" the established position of the corporatist ideology by presumably larger demands from the state than it would be expected in the political cultures of countries not characterized by such a strong, even if only oppositional, socialist tradition. Such increased statist expectations of the Mediterranean regimes stemming from their socialist tradition may be further compounded by yet another feature of the Mediterranean regimes noted by Ferrera (1996) . Specifically, these countries are characterized by relatively new democratic institutions developed in the post-authoritarian contexts which sustain weak and bureaucratic state institutions and contribute to the corruption and political clientelism. Such developments may have established a parallel system of informal statist expectations, as the everyday practices of the Mediterranean populations taught them to expect they would have their needs satisfi ed by the state, provided they followed the "rules" of such a corrupt and bureaucratic system.
The entrance of post-communist countries to the stage of market democracies further rippled the waves of welfare regimes debates. Their earlier communist incarnations were characterized by extreme statism, proclaimed equality and generous social provisions, but also by ineffi ciency and hidden privileges (Deacon, 2000) . Both these similarities and these countries' nearsimultaneous embrace of democracy and capitalism often blur the abundant/numerous differences between former communist regimes, both in their communist and precommunist paths. Indeed, based on these differences, many researchers argue that, from the historical viewpoint, one should differentiate between the Central European, Balkan and Soviet-successor post-communist countries (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; Kitschelt, 2003; Kopstein & Reilly, 2003) . Further, with the post-communist transformations in the 1990s, these countries started on diverse paths of further welfare developments, both in the levels of acceptance of the liberal reforms and in the speed and scope of social policy reforms (see the 1996 World Bank and the 1998 UNDP report de-scribed in Deacon, 2000; Kovács, 2002) . As a result, various authors disagree whether one should focus on the internal differences when discussing the post-communist welfare regimes, or on their underlying similarities. In one approach, the various postcommunist countries are discussed in terms of how their specifi c welfare developments fi t into Esping-Andersen's classifi cation. A different viewpoint, however, posits that the general trends of a "post-socialist" welfare state can be examined. This type of analysis usually discusses whether these countries are succumbing to the external liberalizing pressures or whether they are developing towards a conservative-corporatist regime, particularly in the context of their Bismarckian legacies and the pull of the European integrations (Deacon, 2000; Kovács, 2002; Fenger, 2007; Aidukaite, 2009; Szikra & Tomka, 2009 ). Finally, some authors also question if the discussion of the post-communist countries within the framework of Esping-Andersen's classifi cation is appropriate at all or if these states exhibit characteristics of institutional hybrids (Cerami, 2006; Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009) .
Therefore, the final judgment on the post-communist welfare state or states seems far from settled. However, for the purposes of the present article, it is not necessary to engage in these debates. Instead, I made a pragmatic decision to include all the post-communist countries as one "postcommunist regime", based solely on choosing their "post-communist condition" as the characteristic that, I hypothesize, still ties these countries together despite their possibly divergent welfare paths after the ruptures of 1989/91. Thus, this becomes the only characteristic salient for the present study. This is, of course, a simplifi cation -being post-communist is not these countries' only defi ning feature. But, since the present study asks whether the shared communist welfare heritage can be detected in the expectations about the strong role of state and if this distinguishes this particular set of countries from their Western European neighbors, it follows that for the purposes of this study "the post-communist condition" is the most salient feature of these countries. In light of this, perhaps the most important shared characteristic of the post-communist countries is their heritage of the (communist) statism (Deacon, 2000) , which, similarly to the social-democratic regimes, accorded the greatest role in taking care of people's needs to the state. However, similarly to the Mediterranean regimes, another heritage of the communist regimes is the bureaucratic ineffi ciency and nepotism (Deacon, 2000) , as well as the context of a relatively recent democratization in the post-authoritarian or even semi-authoritarian states. Further, considering that the pre-communist welfare traditions were mostly based on the Bismarckian tradition, this adds possible corporatist elements to the mix of the high (informal) statist expectations and malfunctioning public administration system. With this, the welfare post-communist institutional contexts become startlingly similar to the Mediterranean regimes' contexts. 1 The other usually mentioned predictor of the welfare state attitudes is self-interest, which also functions both at the individual and the country level. The self-interest argument suggests that welfare state attitudes refl ect interests which stem from individuals' structural positions. Specifi cally, those in vulnerable positions (e.g. lower educated, older, unemployed) more likely support the extensive role of the state, particularly in the area of their vulnerability (Gelissen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jaeger, 2006b ). At the country-level, the explanations are sought in a country's (macro)economic performance, where the inhabitants of the countries with poorer performance would be more favorably inclined towards a generous welfare state (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Brooks & Manza, 2007) . The self-interest, however, is not of a substantive interest in the present study, and it will therefore be used only as a control. 
Welfare State Attitudes and Welfare Regimes
A popular hypothesis in the welfare attitudes research proposes ideology as one of the important predictors of the welfare state attitudes. Ideology, the argument goes, infl uences welfare attitudes both at the individual and at the country level.
1 At the individual level, the more general values determine welfare attitudes. For example, those with egalitarian, leftist or postmaterialist values are more supportive of the state (Gelissen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jaeger, 2006b; Aidukaite, 2009) . However, Svallfors (2010) considers this type of attitudes-by-attitudes explanations problematic. I agree with his position since, if the two sets of substantively related attitudes cluster together, it is diffi cult to disentangle the direction of their mutual infl uences. More relevant for the purpose of the present paper, then, are the country-level ideological infl uences on the welfare attitudes. In this type of ideological explanations, the welfare state attitudes are linked with the welfare regimes, which also includes the assumptions of the entrenchment of the attitudes and the feedback loop between the institutional confi gurations and values (Brooks & Manza, 2007) . In other words, the established welfare regimes are expected to shape the expectations about the welfare state, thus leading to cross-national variation in attitudes consistent with the regime differences. Therefore, support for the strong role of state would be the greatest in the social democratic regimes and the smallest in the liberal regimes.
The results of the research examining the link between the welfare regimes and welfare state attitudes, however, are mixed and inconclusive (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jaeger, 2006a) . For example, Gellissen (2000) uses multilevel modeling on the 1992 Eurobarometer data to examine the support for the welfare state in 11 European capitalist countries, and fi nds little evidence of the regimes influencing attitudes. Svallfors (2003) compares the attitudes about government responsibility across eight Western capitalist countries in the 1996 ISSP data and reaches similar conclusions. Dallinger (2010) examines the support for income redistribution in the 1999 ISSP data for 23 capitalist and post-communist countries using multilevel analysis, and also fi nds little effect of the welfare regime on attitudes. Nevertheless, there is also evidence for the regime-based clustering of attitudes. For example, Andreß and Heien (2001) compare the support for government responsibility and equality in the 1992 ISSP data in West and East Germany, Norway and the USA by structural equation models, and they fi nd the expected attitude differences. Similarly, Linos and West (2003) fi nd the regime differences in the redistribution attitudes in the 1992 ISSP data for Norway, Germany, Australia and the USA. Arts and Gelissen (2001) examine 19 Western democracies using multilevel modeling on the 1996 ISSP and 1999 EVS data and conclude that regimes matter in expectations about state's role for solidarity. Finally, Brooks and Manza (2007) also fi nd the welfare state attitudes clustering across regimes in fi ve ISSP waves (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) in 16 developed democracies.
Many studies, however, use different classifi cations of welfare regimes, which may explain their inconsistent results. Sometimes they include only the typical representatives, such as Sweden, Norway or Denmark as social democratic (Gelissen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Dallinger, 2010 ), France, Austria or (West) Germany as conservative (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Dallinger, 2010) and the UK or the USA as liberal regimes (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Dallinger, 2010 In addition, Dallinger's is one of rare studies including the post-communist countries, which she classifi es as a separate regime. Further problems arise with the countries which are untypical or hybrid types (the Netherlands is such an example), and indeed, in practice, most countries are hybrid types, which in turn leads to disagreements about classifi cations across various studies (Arts & Gelissen, 2002) . Some studies attempt to avoid the classifi cation problem by looking at various country-level characteristics instead of classifying countries into regimes. Such studies, however, usually analyze the effects of particular predictors (such as public social spending), rather than the link between the institutional and the attitudinal clustering (see, for example, Jaeger, 2006a) .
Regime classifi cation is a problem the present study faces as well. However, as I am interested in the infl uence of the longterm institutional confi gurations on the state attitudes, I use the welfare regimes primarily as indicators of country's welfare heritage. This allows me to sidestep the issue of regime change and hybrid types and to theoretically categorize countries based on their main historical heritage. For example, Ireland incorporates both the liberal and the corporatist elements and it is variously classifi ed as liberal or conservative (McCashin & O'Shea, 2009 ). However, the Irish welfare state was created during the British rule and the liberal tradition remained strong even after the independence, despite the later heavy infl uences of the Catholic Church and the corporatist policies (McCashin & O'Shea, 2009) . Hence, based on its longterm liberal heritage, I classify Ireland as a liberal regime, the same as the UK. Further, the Netherlands is a hybrid between the social democratic and corporatist regime, but I classify it as a corporatist, based on the prevalence of such classifi cations among other authors (Arts & Gelissen, 2002) . The other countries classifi ed as corporatist are Austria, Belgium, France, West Germany and Luxembourg. The countries classifi ed as social democratic are Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
I also include the Mediterranean and post-communist countries as separate regimes based on their distinct historical developments. The Mediterranean regimes are Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, to which I add Malta and Cyprus, as members of the extended family of Mediterranean states (Gal, 2010) . Malta and Cyprus are actually hybrid regimes (Briguglio & Bugeja, 2011; Shekeris, Ioannou, & Panayiotopoulos, 2009; Pace, 2009; Gal, 2010) . They are both former British colonies characterized by the liberal tradition 2 ,which is combined with the strong religious infl uences, the reliance on the family, the bureaucratic system, the partisan and clientelistic politics, the labor market segmentation and a large shadow economy, which all characterize Mediterranean regimes (Briguglio & Bugeja, 2011; Shekeris et al., 2009; Pace, 2009; Gal, 2010) . In addition, with other Mediterranean states, Malta and Cyprus also share a young democratic tradition (which is here placed in the post-colonial, rather than postauthoritarian context) and the late modernization (Gal, 2010) . Due to these historical developments, Malta and Cyprus are classifi ed as Mediterranean regimes.
Finally, since the communist countries were particularly characterized by the communist statist tradition and the present study focuses on the extreme support for the state's responsibility for people's needs in the examination of the welfare state attitudes, I classify all post-communist countries as the post-communist regime. This includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
Cultural Lag and the Generational Change in the Post-Communist Context
Contrary to popular pre-transition beliefs, the post-communist institutional transformations were not immediately followed by new democratic and capitalist values (Arts & Gijsberts, 1998; Aligica, 2003) . Indeed, many post-communist problems could be traced to people not adapting successfully to the institutional demands of the new capitalist systems. These unsuccessful adaptations were often explained by people's persistent communist expectations (Sztompka, 1996; Arts, Gelissen, & Luijkx, 2003) . When faced with the new uncertainties of their lives, the people of the post-communist countries often continued to expect from the state to take care of their needs, as it did in communism. For example, a study based on the 1991 International Social Justice Project (ISJP) data found greater support for the role of state in East Germany than in West Germany (Wegener, Lippl, & Christoph, 2000) . Similarly, another ISJP study comparing Western democratic and post-communist CEE countries found that the post-communist populations required greater state intervention than their Western counterparts, and these expectations of state's intervention were only moderately weaker in 1996 than in 1991 (Örkény & Székely, 2000) . Furthermore, this East/West distinction held even a decade later, as demonstrated by the higher support for "socialist" socioeconomic principle of justice and government intervention in CEE countries found in a study based on the 1999/2000 EVS data (Arts et al., 2003) . In light of this divide in values and expectations about the role of state between the non-communist and the post-communist regimes, I expect that the post-communist populations will generally have higher statist expectations than their counterparts in other European welfare regimes, with a possible exception of the people in the Mediterranean regimes whose institutional contexts also support high informal statist expectations.
Such persistence of expectations related to the communist socio-economic or political order among people who spent their lives in communist societies is unsurprising. Indeed, the life-course research suggests that values and attitudes formed during adolescence and early adulthood (formative or impressionable years) remain stable thereafter (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991; Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Sears & Funk, 1999) . Further, the values and attitudes after formative years should remain stable even in the face of institutional changes, thus resulting in the cultural lag of the older generations (Sztompka, 1996; Pollack, Jacobs, Müller, & Pickel, 2003) . It would follow, then, that the generations who spent their formative years in the established communist regimes would exhibit such cultural lag in their values, and particularly in their statist expectations as the perception of the state's role was one of the crucial differences between the communist and capitalist regimes. However, this life-course model of attitude change also posits that the new generations, socialized within new cultural and institutional frameworks, will exhibit a new set of values, different from those of their preceding generations, and thus these new generations will affect a transformation of the dominant societal values Alwin & McCammon, 2003; Sztompka, 1996; Inglehart, 2000) . From this it follows that the "communist cultural lag" will disappear with the so-called post-communist generations. Therefore, in the present study, I expect that the new post-communist generations will be less supportive of the state responsibility than the people fully socialized in communism.
Such cohort differences between the youngest and the older generations should be absent from other (non-communist) European welfare regimes, as these generations did not experience such a radical relatively recent transformation in the ruling economic and political order that would affect such a dramatic cohort gap. This is not to say that there will be no cohort differences in the expectations about the role of the state between the various generations of the non-communist welfare regimes. On the contrary, various generations in the non-communist welfare regimes have also been socialized in the societies that changed their welfare institutional arrangements and their welfare state expectations. Specifi cally, the period between the World War II and the 1970s was characterized by a drastic expansion of the welfare state, accompanied by the rise of the idea of universal social rights (Nullmeier & Kaufmann, 2010) . In the 1980s, however, the welfare state's legitimacy was increasingly questioned, and in the 1990s in particular the welfare states weakened due to the more pervasive globalization and stronger liberalizing pressures (Nullmeier & Kaufmann, 2010; Swank, 2010) . Hence, the younger generations of the non-communist welfare regimes were socialized in the less "welfare-state-friendly" societies and they will likely also have smaller expectations from the welfare state than their preceding generations. However, as the divide between the "welfare-state-friendly" and the "welfare-state-unfriendly" stages in the non-communist regimes was less stark than the divide between the communist and post-communist welfare regimes, so the cohort gap in the statist expectations in the non-communist regimes will be less wide than such cohort gap in the post-communist regimes. Therefore, the argument of the present study is that, although the developments of the non-communist welfare regimes might have led to the cohort differences in statist expectations between the younger and older generations, this cohort gap must be smaller than the cohort gap between the younger (post-communist) and older (communist) generations in the former communist societies which had affected such an about-face about their the welfare institutional arrangements and expectations about the state's role in it.
In accordance with the arguments above, I propose the following hypotheses: The present study examines (1) how the individual-level characteristics (cohort differences) affect the extreme support for state responsibility; (2) how the ideological macro-determinants (welfare regimes) affect the extreme support for state responsibility, and (3) how welfare regimes mediate the cohort differences in the extreme support for state responsibility. This combines micro and macro levels of analysis in examining the extreme support for the state responsibility, which is here a binary outcome. Therefore, I use the multilevel or hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs) for binary outcomes (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010) . Multilevel modeling takes into consideration the clustered structure of data and allows examining if the unexplained between-country variability can be explained by country-level variables (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010). 3 HGLMs with the logit link were estimated in Stata 11.2 using its default Full Maximum Likelihood Method (FML) with numerical integration (adaptive Gaussian quadrature).
4 FML with numerical integration provides more precise estimates than the approximation methods (such as marginal or penalized quasi-likelihood methods) (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010) .
It also has an additional benefi t of making the use of the deviance or likelihood ratio tests appropriate for the fi t of models and the signifi cance of the random effects (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010) .
The missing data were treated by listwise deletion, which led to loss of 7% of the full sample. The listwise deletion may infl ate standard errors even when the data is missing completely at random (MCAR), and the non-MCAR data may produce biased estimates (Acock, 2005) . Nevertheless, with the minimal amount of the missing data (usually below 5%) and with ignorable missingness, the listwise deletion is usually acceptable (Allison, 2009; McKnight, McKnight, Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007) . 7% missing data in my analysis is larger than the recommended amount, but not overly so. The individuals in the subsample with missing values on the variables of interest were more likely females, less educated and less likely to have full-time employment or be self-employed, which violates the MCAR assumption, though assumption of the data missing at random (MAR) may still hold. The MAR assumption cannot be directly tested (Allison, 2009) , but in eyeballing the data I have not noticed systemic patterns of missing values across variables of interest. Therefore, I used listwise deletion rather than more complex missing data treatments, such as multiple imputations (Acock, 2005) , that, in combination with a method such as HGLM, are very computationally intensive and restrict post-estimation analyses. The sample with full information on variables of interest is a pooled sample of 29 countries (N) and 39019 respondents (n).
3 No clear agreement exists on the appropriate group size in multilevel modeling, and the considerations include study's goals and practical concerns in collecting data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010) . Kreft suggests 30 groups if the study centers on fi xed effects (Hox, 2010) . Others relax this requirement and suggest that, under certain conditions, 20 group-level units could be suffi cient (Bickel, 2007) . The present analysis with 29 countries is, therefore, a study with small country-level sample size. 4 Stata's xtmelogit currently does not allow using weights. In addition, my use of cohorts as predictors further removes benefi ts of weighing. Therefore, I did not use gender by age sampling weights provided by the EVS.
Measures
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a binary variable Extreme Support for State Responsibility for Needs, which measures the degree of individual support for government measures. It was constructed out of the EVS item asking respondents to position their view on the 10-point scale from "Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves" to "The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for". The respondents who positioned themselves on the extreme end of the state responsibility side (points 8-10) were recoded as expressing Extreme Support for State Responsibility for Needs. 18.11% of all respondents in the non-missing sample held an extreme view of state responsibility.
Most other research on the welfare state attitudes used the ISSP 5-point government responsibility items (e.g. to decrease income differences, provide jobs, guarantee basic income) to examine welfare state attitudes. However, since it is not uncommon for people to simultaneously accept different principles of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1985; Miller, 1992) , and consequently different principles of re-distribution and state responsibility, the advantage of the EVS item over the ISSP ones is that it forces the respondents to choose the principle more salient to their viewpoint. The further dichotomization of this variable crystallizes the respondents with extreme statist perspective, which is somewhat incongruent with the capitalist market-oriented ideology and thus can be interpreted as an undesirable answer. Admittedly, this strategy artifi cially removes the variation of the original variable, but the distribution of the original ordinal variable is already skewed and this strategy sharpens the focus on the minority whose attitudes on the state responsibility challenge the now-dominant liberal ideologies of the Western world.
Independent Variables
The main individual-level independent variable is Birth Cohort. It consists of three 15-year cohort categories and the category of the oldest respondents: 1) born 1977-91; 2) born 1962-76; 3) born 1947-61, and 4) born 1946 or earlier. Members of the youngest cohort in the post-communist countries are the post-communist generation as they were 12 or younger (or not born yet) in 1989, which means that they spent their formative years in the new capitalist regimes. The members of the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 in the post-communist countries spent their whole lives before 1989 in the communist regimes, so they form the communist generations. The fi nal category is a residual category of the oldest respondents.
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The main country-level independent variable is Welfare Regime, which serves as an indicator of the ideological welfare 5 The category of the oldest respondents includes people whose formative infl uences cannot be clearly separated, so it is excluded from interpretations of the link between ideological infl uences and cohort differences. However, the presence of the oldest respondents may still help in disentangling the cohort and the age effects and this is the reason why the oldest respondents were not dropped from the models. The youngest cohort was 18-32 years old at the time of survey, and the oldest cohort was over 62.Therefore, the bulk of these two cohorts comprises of two vulnerable populations (the young and the old) usually associated with greater support for state (Gelissen, 2000) . Hence, if the youngest and the oldest respondents cluster together in greater support for state intervention across regimes, this may suggest that the mechanism at work is age effect due to the vulnerability of these two groups, rather than the cohort (socialization) effect. However, to anticipate the results, the youngest and the oldest respondents have indeed clustered together in their statist expectations, but these statist expectations were low, thus suggesting that some other mechanism, rather than the effect of age on statist values, is at work.
heritage. The EU member countries and Croatia as an acceding member were classifi ed into fi ve regime types: post-communist, social democratic, Mediterranean, conservative-corporatist and liberal regime (Table 1) . Table 2 . Table 1 summarizes average country positions on the extreme support for state responsibility. The most statist are the post-communist and the Mediterranean regimes where over 20% (and sometimes close to 30%) respondents in most countries favored extreme state responsibility. Among post-communist countries, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania and Slovak Republic deviate from this pattern. Nevertheless, their levels of extreme statism are still higher than in other countries, with the exception of France and Belgium which stand out among the corporatist, social-democratic and liberal countries with higher statist levels. Among Mediterranean regimes, Portugal is the only one with low score on extreme statism. I fi rst estimated the so-called empty model with no explanatory variables, which provides basic between-country variability (Snijders & Bosker, 1999) which means that about 5% of variance in the extreme support for state responsibility is due to between-country variation. Although low, the likelihood ratio test suggests this is signifi cant, as the multilevel logit model provides a signifi cantly better fi t than one-level logistic regression ( χ 2 (01) = 929.02, p<0.05).
RESULTS
Model 1 is a random intercept model with only individual-level covariates (Table  3) . After controlling for cohorts and selfinterest, the residual ICC is only slightly lower at 0.046. Therefore, in Model 2, which contains individual-level covariates without non-signifi cant satisfaction of life, I added the country-level covariates, which decreased the proportion of the unexplained country-level variance in the outcome (residual ICC) to 0.025. However, since the effects of GDP, Gini index and the unemployment rate are not signifi cant, I dropped them from further analysis. This slightly increased the residual ICC to 0.026, but Model 3 has better fi t (see AIC statistics in Table 3 ) and is more parsimonious. This model, π ij = logistic (γ 00 + γ 1-3,0 cohort ij + γ 0,1-4 regime j + γ 4j ×gender ij + γ 5j ×education ij + γ 6-13j ×employment ij + γ 14j ×view_govn ij + u 0j ), explains 8% of variation in the outcome. are considerably lower than the OLS R 2 for continous outcomes. 
FIXED EFFECTS
Individual-level Variables
Intercept γ The results from Model 3 suggest that for cohorts 1962-77 and 1947-61 the probability of the extreme support for state is, respectively, by 0.13 and by 0.10 higher than for the youngest cohort, holding other covariates constant (p<0.05).
7 Next, the post-communist people do not differ from the Mediterranean populations in the probability of extreme statist views. The same is true for the social-democratic populations (although at 0.10 level the signifi cant differences emerge). The contrast, however, is clear with the liberal and corporatist populations who have, respectively, by 0.80 and by 0.55 lower probability of extreme statism than the post-communist people, holding other variables constant (p<0.05). Further, the Wald tests (not shown, p<0.05) suggest that the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 do not differ mutually. The Mediterranean people also do not signifi cantly differ from the social-democratic populations, although they do from the liberal and the corporatist ones. Finally, there are no signifi cant differences between the liberal, corporatist and socialdemocratic regimes. These results indicate a clustering of the communist and Mediterranean regimes on the one side with a higher probability of extreme statist views, and a clustering of the corporatist and liberal regimes on the other side, with the socialdemocratic regime in the middle.
As expected, all the remaining individual controls of self-interest have a signifi cant effect on the probability of extreme support for state responsibility. Being female, as well as working part-time, being retired, housewife, unemployed or disabled as opposed to working full-time increases the probability of extreme expectations of state responsibility, whereas higher levels of education and a better evaluation of country governance decrease this probability.
The coeffi cients in logit models are not interpretable without the identifi cation of other covariates, so I calculated probabilities of extreme support for state responsibility across cohorts and regimes for two types of individuals: typical and vulnerable (Table  4) . As expected, the vulnerable individuals are more supportive of the state's role across all categories. But, the cohort and regime differences are also clear. Both the typical and the vulnerable individuals from the youngest cohort across all regimes are less likely to hold extreme statist views than the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 . Also, all the cohorts from the post-communist and Mediterranean regimes have higher probabilities of extreme views on state responsibility than their counterparts from other regimes, whose ordering is as expected.
The present study hypothesized that the cohort effect would vary across regimes. Therefore, I allowed the slopes for cohort categories 1947-61 and 1962-76 to vary randomly across countries in Model 4, which means that this model assumes that the cohort differences function differently for each country. This again improved the model fi t, although it brought down the residual ICC to 0.04.The proportion of the explained variance remained the same: 8%. Nevertheless, the likelihood ratio test suggested 18 (0.12-0.25) 0.18 (0.11-0.24) that the Model with the random slopes for cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 (Model 4 ) is more appropriate than the Model with all slopes fi xed (Model 3) (χ 2 (2)= 9.57, p<0.05). This would suggest that, indeed, the cohort effect on the extreme support for state responsibility does not function equally across countries. In Model 5 I attempted to account for the part of this variation in random slopes for cohorts by cross-level interactions of cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 and regimes. Since only one interaction (cohort 1962-76-Mediterranean regime) was signifi cant and cross-level interactions of cohorts and regimes were not jointly signifi cant, Model 5 adds only this significant interaction to Model 4. The signifi cant positive cross-level interaction in Model 5 suggests that the cohort differences in the probability of extreme support for state responsibility between cohort 1962-76 and the youngest cohort are larger in the Mediterranean than in the post-communist regimes. Further, the difference between the cohort 1962-76 and the youngest cohort in the non-Mediterranean regimes (Z=0) is not signifi cant. 8 The proportion of explained variance in Model 5 remained unchanged compared to Model 4, but the model fi t improved. In addition, controlling for the cohort 1962-76-Mediterranean regime interaction decreased the residual ICC to 0.03 and diminished random slopes variances, which suggests that this cross-level interaction accounts for some random variation in cohort slopes. Therefore, Model 5 is my fi nal model:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In conclusion, all the cohorts in the postcommunist countries were generally more likely to have extreme statist views than the individuals in other European welfare states, controlling for individual self-interest. The exceptions were the individuals in the Mediterranean regimes who clustered together with the individuals from the postcommunist regimes in higher probability of extreme statist views. Therefore, the fi rst hypothesis proposing higher statist expectations in the post-communist regimes is confi rmed. However, the fact that the postcommunist individuals were joined by the Mediterranean individuals in greater support for extreme statist views indicates that the explanation of this development must be more complex than attributing this to "the non-communist expectations vs. persistent communist expectations" divide. Instead, I believe that the clustering of the Mediterranean regimes with the post-communist ones could be explained by a small adaptation of the welfare expectations argument. This requires defi ning the dominant welfare practices as determinants of the welfare expectations, rather than the dominant welfare ideologies.
In most cases, these two are integrated (e.g. liberal regimes implement liberal welfare practices), but in the case of the Mediterranean regimes they were not. The Mediterranean regimes are characterized by welfare practices based on ineffective state institutions, corruption and political clientelism. Such practices teach people they can have their needs satisfi ed by the state, provided they follow the informal rules. As a result, the state responsibility for needs becomes the informally established expectation, independent of the formal ruling ideology. Similar discrepancy between the ideology of universal and generous social rights and the bureaucratization and hidden privileges was characteristic of communism as well, and likely cemented the emphasis on state as provider of needs (whether legally or by following the informal rules). Therefore, the legacy of dominant state-oriented welfare practices might explain the distinctiveness of the post-communist and the Mediterranean regimes in higher probabilities of extreme views on state responsibility.
In other regimes, the welfare practices and the welfare regime ideologies were integrated. For this reason, the results from other regimes are consistent with the ideology argument expectations, as can be seen from the regime rankings in Table 4 that are mostly consistent with the ranking of welfare ideology expectations. Specifi cally, the individuals in the liberal regimes have the lowest scores on the extreme statist views, and they are followed by the individuals from the corporatist regime, and then by the individuals from the social democratic regimes. Therefore, the regime differences do matter.
The second hypothesis of the present study proposed a cultural lag of the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 compared to the youngest cohort, as these two older cohorts were predominantly socialized in the ideological environment which gave the state a greater role in taking care of people's needs in all Western regimes. I further expected that this cultural lag would be more pronounced among the cohorts 1947-61 and 1962-76 in the former communist countries since the "welfare-friendly" period in which they were socialized was further compounded by the specifi c communist welfare arrangements of the countries in which they lived. Under the life-course assumption about stability of attitudes formed during the formative years, I proposed that these "communist generations" remained constant in their "communist" value systems. The youngest (post-communist) generation, on the other hand, was possibly more affected by the radical post-communist transformations. It would follow that the differences in extreme statist views between the youngest and the older generations should be more pronounced in the post-communist regimes than in other European welfare states where no comparable radical social transformation that would separate these generations so sharply occurred. However, the results of the present study have not confi rmed this hypothesis. The youngest cohort was indeed more likely to have lower scores on the probability of extreme statist views than the cohort 1947-61 in all regimes, but this cohort gap was generally not wider in the post-communist regimes than in the non-communist regimes. Therefore, the divide separating the cohort 1947-61, socialized in the "golden period" of the welfare state across all regimes, from the youngest cohort 1977-91, socialized in the period of weakening of that welfare state across all regimes (Nullmeier & Kaufmann, 2010) , suggests that this cohort gap is more likely the outcome of the global welfare trends rather than the trends specifi c to the postcommunist (or Mediterranean) states. Nevertheless, the specifi c welfare practices of particular regimes do matter, as seen from the regime differences in the scores on extreme statism that are consistent across all cohorts.
However, whereas the cohort gap in the probability of extreme statist expectations between the cohort 1947-61 and the youngest cohort is quite clear, the relationship between the cohort 1962-76 and the youngest cohort is more complex. On the one hand, the results suggest the youngest cohort is also less statist than the cohort 1962-76. On the other hand, the model controlling for the cohort-regime interactions suggests that in the non-Mediterranean regimes the signifi cance of this cohort gaps disappears, while in the Mediterranean regimes this cohort gap in extreme statist views is signifi cant and larger than in the post-communist regimes. What are the implications of such fi ndings? First, this seems to suggest a similarity between the cohorts 1962-76 (coming to age in times when the upcoming welfare state crisis was becoming more apparent) and the youngest cohort 1977-91 in the non-Mediterranean regimes. Hence, it seems that the values divide between these two consecutive cohorts is not as sharp as between the youngest cohort and the cohort 1947-61. This, in turn, suggests a gradual generational shift in the welfare state attitudes in the non-Mediterranean regimes, most likely due to the infl uences of the global welfare trends that affected the cohorts of the former communist and the cohorts of other non-communist countries similarly. This shift in values, however, continued to follow the particular regime trajectories, as evidenced by the persistent regime differences in the extreme statist views of these two cohorts across post-communist, social democratic, corporatist and liberal countries. But, why does this not hold for the Mediterranean regimes as well? Why the divide in the extreme statist views between the youngest cohort and the cohort 1962-76 remains sharper in the Mediterranean than in other countries? Explaining this is likely beyond the scope of this paper, but I would suggest the following speculation. It is possible that because the Mediterranean populations did not experience such a radical institutional transformation like the post-communist populations did, the cohort 1962-76 in the Mediterranean countries remained more entrenched in the habits of their dominant state-oriented welfare practices and consequent high statist expectations. The communist cohort 1962-76, on the other hand, had their expectations more shaken up by the very obvious different institutional confi gurations of the new post-communist welfare states and thus they clustered closer to the post-communist generations for which such greater insecurities about the role of the state were part of their coming of age.
In conclusion, the present study suggests that the welfare state expectations are affected by the individuals' welfare environments, where welfare environments are defi ned both at the global and at regime level. First, the global welfare state trends determine welfare environments by affecting countries' welfare policies. Thus, the generations coming of age in golden times of welfare state and generous welfare practices were more likely to favor state responsibility for needs than the new generations growing up in the world of globalizing and liberalizing pressures on the welfare state The welfare regimes determine welfare environments as well, by mediating global welfare trends via its ideologies and practices. The welfare ideologies and practices are in most cases integrated, thus leading to the ranking of the statist expectations congruent with the regime ideologies. However, when they are not, as in the Mediterranean regimes, the welfare practices, which form the reality of people's everyday lives, seem to take precedence over the dominant regime ideology. Finally, the welfare state expectations show endurance in face of change. Thus, the post-communist and the Mediterranean regimes, both characterized by the legacy of the statist practices, also stand out with the higher probability of extreme statist attitudes among all cohorts which persist despite the global and particular (post-communist) institutional changes. Therefore, once formed, the welfare public preferences matter and should prove a relevant factor in evaluating the legitimacy of welfare states.
